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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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7 SELENE FINANCE, L.P.,

8 Plaintiff,

9 v.

10 SUNRISE HIGHLANDS COMMUNITY
11 ASSOCIATION et al.,

12 Defendants.

Case No. 2:16-cv-02521-KJD-NJK

ORDER

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14 Presently before the Court is Defendant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC's Motion for
15 Summary Judgment (#41). Plaintiff filed a response (#48) to which SFR Investments Pool 1,
16 LLC replied (#58). Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (#42).
17 Defendants filed responses (## 50, 51) to which Plaintiff replied (#62). Also before the Court is
18 Defendant Sunrise Highlands Community Association's Motion for Summary Judgment (#43).
19 Plaintiff filed a response (#49) to which Sunrise Highlands Community Association replied
20 (#59).

21 **I. Background**

22 This case emerges from the non-judicial foreclosure sale on or about December 17, 2013
23 of the property located at 2812 Murray Hill Lane, Las Vegas, Nevada 89142 ("Property"). This
24 case shares a similar fact pattern with many cases currently pending before this Court, all having
25 to do with HOA foreclosure sales. The several motions presently pending before the Court center
26 in whole or in part around the question of what notice of default the foreclosing party was
27 required to provide Plaintiff prior to its foreclosure sale on the Property. After the Nevada
28 Supreme Court's decision in SFR Investments Pool 1 LLC v. U.S. Bank, the Ninth Circuit

1 decided Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir.
2 2016), holding NRS 115.3116(2)'s statutory notice scheme was facially unconstitutional. In light
3 of Bourne Valley, what notice an HOA must provide prior to foreclosing on a superpriority lien
4 remains uncertain.

5 **II. Analysis**

6 **A. Certified Question**

7 On April 21, 2017, in Bank of New York Mellon v. Star Hills Homeowners Association,
8 this Court certified the following question to the Nevada Supreme Court: "Whether NRS §
9 116.31168(1)'s incorporation of NRS § 107.090 requires homeowners associations to provide
10 notices of default to banks even when a bank does not request notice?" Bank of New York
11 Mellon v. Star Hill Homeowners Assoc., 2017 WL 1439671, at *5 (D. Nev. April 21, 2017).

12 In granting certification, the Court reasoned the following: In Bourne Valley, the Ninth
13 Circuit definitively answered the question that the statute's "opt-in" framework was
14 unconstitutional. Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th
15 Cir. 2016). However, that leaves this Court with the unresolved question of what notice must be
16 provided. "It is solely within the province of the state courts to authoritatively construe state
17 legislation." Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). As
18 such, state law questions of first impression like this one should be resolved by the state's
19 highest court. See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944). Allowing the Nevada
20 Supreme Court to answer this question before considering any other motions will provide this
21 Court the necessary guidance as to how to handle the issues of notice and actual notice in light of
22 Bourne Valley.

23 In Bank of New York Mellon, the Court did not and could not rely upon any controlling
24 state law as to the requirements of notice. This Court faces the same predicament here. An
25 answer to the above already certified question will provide much needed clarity, and may be
26 dispositive of many of the issues currently before the Court in this case.

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1 B. Stay of the Case

2 The pending motions in this case implicate the previously certified question regarding
3 what notice state law requires. To save the parties from the need to invest further resources into
4 the issues surrounding the notice requirement, the Court *sua sponte* stays all proceedings in this
5 case and denies all pending motions without prejudice.

6 A district court has the inherent power to stay cases to control its docket and promote the
7 efficient use of judicial resources. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S., 248, 254-55 (1936);
8 Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 200).

9 When determining whether a stay is appropriate pending the resolution of another case—often
10 called a “Landis stay”—the district court must weigh: (1) the possible damage that may result
11 from a stay; (2) any “hardship or inequity” that a party may suffer if required to go forward; and
12 (3) “the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues,
13 proof, and question of law” that a stay will engender. Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098,
14 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). Weighing these considerations, the Court finds that a Landis stay is
15 appropriate.

16 *1. Damage from a stay*

17 The only potential damage that may result from a stay is that the parties will have
18 to wait longer for resolution of this case and any motions that they have filed or intend to file in
19 the future. But a delay would also result from any rebriefing or supplemental briefing that may
20 be necessitated pending the Nevada Supreme Court’s answer to the certified question. It is not
21 clear that a stay will ultimately lengthen the life of this case.

22 Additionally, a stay of this case pending resolution of the certified question is
23 expected to be reasonably short. This Court certified the question approximately nine months
24 ago, and briefing on the pending petition in Nevada’s Supreme Court is completed. Because the
25 length of this stay is directly tied to the petition proceedings in that case, it is reasonably brief,
26 and not indefinite. Thus, the Court finds only minimal possible damage that this stay may cause.

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